Airborne assault on corregidor: a study in weather, terrain, and cultural landscapes by Lohman, Andrew D.
97
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 46, Nr 1, 2018. doi: 10.5787/46-1-1227
AIRBORNE ASSAULT ON CORREGIDOR:  
A STUDY IN WEATHER, TERRAIN, AND 
CULTURAL LANDSCAPES
Andrew D Lohman
United States Military Academy, West Point
Abstract
In many ways, military forces using advanced technologies have been able to 
overcome a number of the inherent and traditional challenges posed by physical 
geography. However, geography continues to play a significant role in military planning 
and operations in two areas that have received little attention in the literature, namely 
airborne operations and the cultural landscape. This case study sought to contribute to 
these discussions by analysing the American operation to seize Corregidor Island in 
February 1945. As a primarily airborne assault, the operation was heavily contingent 
on weather, but also on terrain for sufficient drop zones, and the cultural landscape 
and terrain intelligence of the American forces proved vital in this regard. Through 
analysing archival military planning documents, maps, images and other primary 
and secondary sources, this study found that the physical terrain and enemy defences 
dictated the overall plan, but two features of the cultural landscape, the parade ground 
and golf course, were essential to the airborne operation, serving as the smallest drop 
zones used in World War II by US forces. While these two spaces enabled the assault, 
their small size, the buildings surrounding them, and the prevailing winds made this 
mission the most dangerous and highest jump casualty airborne operation of the war. 
Despite the casualties incurred by these features, the bombed-out buildings and debris 
on the drop zones arguably prevented even greater casualties because of the cover 
these provided once paratroopers were assembled on the ground. The intent of this 
discussion is to demonstrate how airborne operations are inherently contingent on 
geography and the challenges and opportunities the cultural landscape could pose 
during a military operation. 
Key words: military geography, airborne operations, Corregidor, cultural landscape, 
terrain intelligence. 
Introduction
Cromley’s recent article in the Professional Geographer, on French parachute 
operations in the French Indochina War, brought attention to the fact that in the vast 
and growing body of military geography literature, little work has been devoted 
specifically to airborne operations.1 This is surprising, as these are inherently dependent 
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on geographic factors such as weather, terrain and overcoming the challenges of 
space and distance through ‘vertical envelopment’. Today, modern technology has 
enabled military forces to overcome, and in many cases nullify, some of the traditional 
impacts of geography, such as the effects of weather, terrain and climate. Airborne 
operations, however, remain largely dependent on specific geographic conditions 
to ensure success. And while strategists are currently debating the future utility and 
risks of airborne operations, discussions of cultural landscapes and places as symbolic 
objectives are receiving much greater attention than ever before in news and strategy 
forums. These debates make the American assault to recapture Corregidor in February 
1945 an interesting case study to analyse as each of these factors played a vital role in 
planning, course, and outcome of the battle. 
The intent of this article is not to recount the ebb and flow of the battle itself, as 
this has been detailed in many excellent works already, but to focus on these three 
aspects:
 • weather as its relates to airborne operations; 
 • the role of what Doyle and Bennett term “terrain intelligence”; and 
 • the cultural landscape – the result of human activity to shape and modify the 
natural environment. 
Towards this end, the article first reports on the examination and description of 
the location and geography of Corregidor, both physical and cultural, as well as the 
Japanese defensive strategy. These geographies illuminate how and why an airborne 
assault was the most favourable course of action. The importance of weather and 
terrain in airborne operations are then discussed, and reveals how Corregidor was 
far from ideal for such an assault. However, the Americans possessed a tremendous 
amount of ‘terrain intelligence’ about the island, which proved vital to the planning 
and ultimate success of the mission. As is described here, the airborne phase of the 
assault was only possible due to two unlikely features of the cultural landscape, the 
parade ground and the golf course. The small size of these spaces as well as the 
shattered buildings surrounding them, however, made these drop zones the most 
dangerous in the war and the 503rd Parachute Regiment experienced the highest jump 
casualties among US airborne forces. Yet, these same features provided invaluable 
cover to the attacking parachutists once on the ground, and possibly saved many of 
the paratroopers’ lives. 
This 1945 battle does not receive a lot of attention in comprehensive works on 
World War II because it is overshadowed by the larger battles and campaigns fought 
during that conflict. Yet, there is a great deal written on the subject, including a large 
number of primary sources in the form of monographs written by American officers 
attending advanced military education courses following the war. During the course 
of this research, a tremendous amount of invaluable, historical personal accounts, 
photos, images and maps were found on the 503d PRCT Heritage Battalion website.2 
These works, together with official army documents and histories, including pre-
invasion operations orders and post-operation narratives, and a number of detailed 
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secondary historical works show that LTG Flanagan’s dedication is extremely apt 
– “For the valiant soldiers of the Rock Force – paratroopers and amphibians – who 
overcame great odds of enemy, terrain, and weather to free Corregidor.”3 
In most of these works, however, authors discuss and assess terrain along the lines 
detailed in Duke Winters’ Battling the elements, describing the impact and influence 
of the physical landscape on battles and campaigns.4 Yet, closer examination of this 
battle reveals that while the physical terrain of Corregidor was indeed challenging, 
arguably the cultural landscape – the physical landscape as modified by human 
activity – played a crucial role in planning and conducting the 1945 attack to recapture 
Corregidor Island. 
Although this battle was fought over 73 years ago, and much has changed in 
military equipment, technology, planning and operations, there are a number of relevant 
lessons for today’s military operating environments. It was an inherently joint and 
well-coordinated operation between the US Army, the Navy and the Army Air Corps, 
and the assaulting force was essentially the modern equivalent of a brigade combat 
team. However, the ultimate objective in the current analysis was to demonstrate how 
geography, and specifically the weather, terrain and cultural landscape, shaped the 
tactical plan for this assault. In conflicts around the world today, cultural landscapes 
are arguably playing a larger and more effectual role, yet, geo-historical analyses of 
past conflicts reveal how important these landscape features have been in the past, and 
how these analyses could inform our current understanding of their role, or potential 
role, in conflict. 
Corregidor Island 
Bush et al. in their Battlebook case study wrote, “Corregidor is a rocky outcrop 
of land which would be totally without significance were it not for its location, 
guarding the entrance to Manila Bay – the largest and most important harbor in the 
Philippines.”5 In the heyday of expanding empires and coastal defence fortifications 
to protect these vital locations, Corregidor, the largest of the five islands that sit in the 
mouth of Manila Bay, assumed a strategic significance (see Figure 1). Flanagan, in 
discussing Corregidor and the four other islands, noted that the islands were formed, 
“through a fortunate quirk of nature,”6 but geologists have concluded that they are the 
remnants of an ancient caldera.7 The island divides the entrance to Manila Bay into 
two channels, the two-mile-wide (3,2 km) North Channel, and the eight-mile-wide 
(12,8 km) South Channel, and provided a crucial forward position from which to 
defend Manila, approximately 30 miles (48 km) to the east.8 
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Figure 1: Army Map Service, Corps of Engineers map of Manila, Philippines (dated 
1955; scale: 1:250 000) showing the location of Corregidor and four other islands 
strategically positioned at the entrance to Manila Bay. 
Figure 2: Corregidor Island from the air before American forces landed, February 
1945. US Army Photo Courtesy National Archives.9 
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Corregidor is often described as a ‘tadpole’ about 5,6 kilometre-long (3,5 miles), 
with the westward head of the island approximately 2,4 kilometres (1,5 miles ) at 
its widest point (see Figures 2 and 3). Most sources list it as approximately 1 735 
acres10 (2,7 square miles or 7 square kilometres), which is approximately twice the 
size of modern-day Central Park in New York City. The topography of the island 
varies greatly, and most analyses divide the island into fi ve segments. The highest 
section on the island is the plateau dubbed “Topside” by Americans. Its highest point 
sits approximately 195 metres (640 feet) above sea level, with steep cliff s on the north, 
west and south sides that drop precipitously to the sea below. Several large, steep-
sided ravines cut through the cliff s to the narrow beaches on three sides. To the east of 
Topside, sits another plateau, “Middleside”, about 121,9–152,4 metres (400–500 feet) 
above the sea, with a steep decline down to “Bottomside”, described as the 550 metre-
wide neck (601,5 yards), which sits only a few feet above sea level and connects the 
head and the tail of the island.11 Just east of Bottomside is Malinta Hill, comprising a 
seam of dacite that rises to approximately 120 metres (390 feet) and descends quickly 
to the tail, which extends for another 3,2 kilometres (2 miles) and gradually narrows 
to a point.12 The western portion of the tail comprises a low ridge with several slight 
hills, while the eastern half is a slight plateau that is graded to allow construction of 
Kindley Field, a 914-metre (3 000-foot) airstrip. Because of the nature of the terrain 
on the tail, it was deemed “the best place for an amphibious landing – it had thousands 
of yards of traversable beach below fi fty foot cliff s”.13
Corregidor was designated an American Military Reservation in 1902, but a regular 
Army post was not established there until 1908, and construction of fortifi cations did 
not begin until 1909 with the arrival of an engineering unit.15 During the next thirteen
Figure 3: Map of Corregidor depicting many aspects of the cultural and militarised 
landscape.14
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years, the US Army expended millions of dollars to fortify four of the five islands in 
Manila Bay, turning Corregidor into a truly militarised landscape. Further efforts to 
fortify the islands ended in 1922 with the Washington Naval Treaty, which both the 
US and Japan signed, to curtail a naval arms race in the Pacific.16 
The landscape of Corregidor was transformed during this process and became 
known as “The Gibraltar of the East”. The focal point of this militarised landscape 
was the island’s 13 batteries composed of 56 12-, 10-, 8-, 6- and 3-inch guns, 12-inch 
mortars, and 155 mm guns and artillery pieces that were crucial to the defence of 
Manila Bay.17 Because the expected threat was from the sea, most of these batteries 
were oriented in that direction. As these fortifications were developed, Corregidor’s 
physical landscape was significantly altered to suit this militarised purpose. During 
this period, the US Army built over 104 km (65 miles) of roads, about 24 km (15 miles) 
of electric rail, headquarters buildings, barracks, a hospital, mess facilities, a power 
generation plant, living quarters for officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and 
soldiers (both Filipino and American), service clubs and storage for the supplies of 
the garrison as well as housing and schools for American and Filipino dependants.18 
Most of the families of the Filipino forces were housed in the small barrio of San 
Jose, at Bottomside on the south shore of the island. Two docks, North and South, 
were constructed to enable the delivery of supplies to support the garrison. Despite the 
prevalence of vegetation on the island, there was a lack of fresh water sources. Water 
was pumped from a series of deep wells on the island, as well as barged to Corregidor 
from the port of Mariveles on Bataan. Despite the unique shape and structure of 
the island, military planners organised these spaces into separate officer, NCO, and 
enlisted soldier housing areas and also added features common to American military 
bases. The most prominent of these were the parade ground adjacent to the Long 
Barracks (see Figure 4), believed to be the longest military barracks in the world at the 
time. They also added a nine-hole golf course to provide recreational opportunities for 
those stationed on the island. These elements of the cultural landscape proved vital for 
American forces during this battle.
Figure 4: Evening formation on the parade field in front of Topside barracks19
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Although the Washington Naval Treaty prohibited further militarisation of the 
landscape, the United States. constructed an elaborate tunnel system, the Malinta 
Tunnel, between 1931 and 1938 to serve as storage space for the garrison’s supplies 
and equipment.20 The main east–west tunnel was 426 metres long (1 400 feet) with 
24 9-metre-wide (30 foot), 121-metre-long (400 foot) lateral tunnels. It also contained 
an additional section of 12 laterals for the hospital and as well as one with 11 laterals 
for use by the quartermaster (see Figure 5). This tunnel system proved to be crucial 
during the intense, month-long bombardment of the island by the Japanese in 1941 
and 1942, providing a significant degree of protection for the Allied garrison, which 
swelled to almost 15 000 before its surrender on 7 May 1942. These tunnels, together, 
with numerous others, constructed as part of their defensive positions in late 1944 
and early 1945, housed significant numbers of Japanese troops during the three-week 
aerial and naval bombardment prior to the American assault on 16 February 1945. 
Figure 5: Sketch of the Malinta Tunnel system on Corregidor. 
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The plan 
On 9 January 1945, the US Sixth Army landed in Lingayen Gulf, followed shortly 
by landings south of Manila. By early February, US forces were converging on the 
city from the north and the south.21 However, the Japanese naval forces continued to 
defend the city and garrisoned Corregidor Island. As described in the official US Army 
history of the Philippines campaign, “Without Corregidor Island, the Port of Manila 
after its capture could not be effectively utilized, as coastal guns on the island could 
hamper our shipping. Too, Corregidor was believed to harbour so-called Japanese 
suicide ‘Q’ boats.”22 
Hence, the question facing US forces was how to assault Corregidor. Throughout 
the war, amphibious assaults were the means through which US and Allied forces 
initiated attacks on islands and coastlines. However, an amphibious assault against 
Corregidor posed significant challenges and risks. Planners, remembering the high 
casualty rates the Japanese suffered in their May 1942 landing on the northern coast 
of Corregidor’s tail, anticipated that an American attempt to attack the island from 
the sea would likely experience significant casualties, particularly as the Japanese 
leadership on Corregidor deemed this the most likely course of action for US forces.23 
Despite having been warned by the Japanese high command to be prepared for a 
potential airborne assault, Captain (Capt.) Akira Itagaki, the Japanese commander on 
Corregidor, did not plan for a defence against an airborne drop. Rather, he focused 
his efforts against an amphibious assault, and based on this assumption, he arrayed 
approximately half his force in positions to defend James, Cheney and Ramsey 
Ravines and at Malinta Hill (see Figure 3), which controlled access from the beaches 
to the high ground on Topside or Malinta Hill. Itagaki placed the reserve forces in the 
Malinta tunnel system.24 
As Capt. Lester Levine, the regimental adjutant, noted in his monograph, there 
were ultimately three reasons for preferring an airborne assault: 
 • the Americans remembered the high Japanese casualties in their assault on the tail 
of Corregidor in May 1942; 
 • the Japanese had three years to fortify the island against amphibious assault; and 
 • the US forces would be forced to make an uphill assault once landed.25 
Although significantly less than in the European theatre, US commanders in 
the Pacific employed the 11th Airborne Division and the 503rd Parachute Infantry 
Regiment in a number of airborne operations in the Southwest Pacific.26 Because of 
anticipated high casualty rates for an amphibious assault, the decision was made to 
conduct an airborne assault against the island, supported by a smaller amphibious 
landing. The mission was assigned to the 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment under 
the command of Colonel (Col.) George M Jones, and together with the attached 462nd 
Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, Company C, 161st Airborne Engineer Battalion, 
and the 3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment (to conduct the amphibious assault), the 
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regimental combat team was dubbed ‘The Rock Force’. Once the mission and unit 
had been assigned, the question of where to drop the paratroopers on the island arose. 
As it quickly became apparent, Corregidor did not appear to be the ideal location for 
an airborne assault. 
Airborne operations
Two of the main principles underlying airborne operations during World War II 
were surprise and mass.27 The ability to project potentially large forces anywhere on 
the battlefield, at any time, unhindered by the constraints of ground or amphibious 
movement, was a significant development during World War II. However, because 
of the nature of airborne operations, these were significantly dependent on a number 
of factors, i.e. trained and ready forces, sufficient troop carrier aircraft, and of course, 
suitable drop zones and the weather. 
Terrain requirements for airborne drop zones were large, flat, open areas free of 
natural or human constructed obstacles (i.e. elements of the cultural landscape such 
as buildings).28 Because mass was one of the guiding principles, there was a desire to 
deliver the maximum number of paratroopers possible in the shortest time. Herrington 
notes, “As a yardstick, an area 1 554,48 meter square (1 700 yard square) is ample 
for an airborne infantry battalion.”29 It was also advisable to have a drop zone of 
sufficient size to discharge a stick of 21 paratroopers (the maximum number in a C-47 
troop carrier plane) in one pass, precluding the need for an individual plane to make 
multiple passes over the same drop zone. 
The two most important atmospheric factors affecting airborne operations are 
wind speed and cloud cover or ceiling, with wind playing a large role in determining 
the minimum drop zone size based on the number of paratroopers dropped in each 
pass. High wind speeds could also greatly disperse soldiers over larger areas as well 
as making consolidation of units on the drop zone significantly more challenging. 
Furthermore, high wind speeds significantly increase the likelihood of paratrooper 
casualties on landing. Although the author was unable to locate doctrinal requirements 
for these factors during the World War II time frame, cloud cover or low cloud ceiling 
would have prevented pilots from locating the drop zones correctly, while wind 
speeds less than 24,08 kilometres per hour (km/h) (13 knots) were considered safe for 
airborne operations.30 
In terms of weather, US forces seemed to be in luck. Capt. Magnus Smith, an 
assistant regimental operations officer in the Rock Force, wrote, “February is the ideal 
time for military operations. During this month, a commander may expect light brief 
showers. In the early mornings a light mist will be present, but it will burn off by 
0830.”31 More detailed climatological and meteorological data for the Philippines 
during the war was not found during the course of this research. However, data from 
Climate-Data.org (see Figure 6) provides a summary of climate data for Corregidor.32 
This data, while not ideal as it was collected for the period 1982 to 2012, appears 
to reflect other commentary about the weather and climate patterns discussed in the 
historic literature.
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Corregidor is classified as an Aw: Tropical Savanna climate (by the Modified 
Köppen system) with a distinct dry winter, an average mean temperature of 26,1 °C 
(79,0 °F), and only 5,99 mm (0,236 inches) of rain in February.33 Additionally, as 
Capt. Mangus Smith noted in his monograph, the Northeast Monsoon weakens in late 
February, and winds average 24,08–31,48 km/h (13–17 knots) from the northeast, 
with potential gusts up to 40,74 km/h (22 knots).34 
Figure 6: Climograph for Corregidor showing the average temperature and 
precipitation during the year. Although airborne forces can drop in the rain, 
increased precipitation is often accompanied by greater cloud cover, which could 
have significantly affected the operation if it was conducted during the wet season. 
February experiences the smallest amount of monthly rainfall. Constructed by author 
using data from Climte-Data.org. 
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The expected wind speeds of 15–20 knots were not viewed as a significant factor 
that would have cancelled or postponed the operation. However, the actual wind speed 
was, at times, approximately 20 miles per hour (21.7 knots), which was five mph 
more than was considered safe for airborne operations at the time. Moreover, wind 
direction was more out of the north than expected.35 These factors, however, did have 
an effect as these higher wind speeds caused the first passes to be dispersed and blew a 
number of the paratroopers off the drop zone and over the cliff, to the narrow beaches 
as well as into the sea below. This error was also a result of the first pass dropping 
paratroopers between 550 and 600 feet above the drop zone, instead of the planned 
400 feet drop altitude. Although several were lost, most were recovered by US patrol 
boats positioned off the shore of Corregidor for such contingencies. Col. Jones and 
the air transport commander flying overhead in a command plane, were able to call 
for subsequent passes to lower their drop altitude and delay the ‘go’ signal for an 
additional six seconds, so that the winds blowing from the north/northeast would not 
further affect the remaining drops. 
While the weather seemed acceptable for an airborne operation, the main question 
of where to drop the paratroopers on the island remained. Yet, in their search to 
determine a suitable drop zone, the American forces had a distinct advantage in terms 
of their intelligence on the island. 
Terrain intelligence and finalising the plan
Although our ability to collect, analyse and process geographic data about 
operational areas has expanded exponentially since 1945, the Rock Force did possess 
a tremendous amount of what Doyle and Bennett36 termed “terrain intelligence”, the 
“databank of information available to commanders” to allow for thorough strategic 
and tactical assessments of the terrain. While this level of terrain intelligence certainly 
contributed to the success of this operation, this case study provided some excellent 
lessons that could help inform how commanders and staffs could use such intelligence 
to formulate operational plans. 
As Col. Jones, commander of the Rock Force, and his staff developed their 
plan, they were afforded a tremendous amount of ‘terrain intelligence’ from various 
sources. Four enlisted soldiers and three officers who had been stationed on Corregidor 
before the war, including Major General (Maj Gen.) William Marquat, who left the 
island with Gen. MacArthur in 1942, were made available to the staffs planning the 
mission.37 As the United States also had air supremacy over the area, planners were 
provided with recent aerial photographs, and commanders and staff down to company 
level were allowed to go along on regular bombing missions to get a first-hand view 
of the island.38 Additionally, the Sixth Army headquarters provided a detailed terrain 
model of the island (see Figure 7) to the unit, not only for commanders and staff to use 
for planning, but also for subordinate commanders to brief these units down to platoon 
level (the model was kept in a tent under guard to maintain operational security).39 
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Figure 7: Col. George Jones, Commander, 503rd Parachute Regimental Combat 
Team, briefing his staff on the terrain model of Corregidor.40
As Capt. Levine wrote, “Corregidor lacked every desirable characteristic for 
a jump zone.”41 It was small, with steep cliffs on the north, west, and south sides, 
and had virtually none of the attributes desired for a large-scale airborne operation. 
Upon initial inspection, it appeared the only suitable drop zone was Kindley Field, 
the landing strip constructed by the Americans before the war (marked ‘Landin 
Field’ in Figure 8). Although Japanese forces occupying Corregidor had not used the 
field, and it was significantly overgrown with vegetation, Col. Jones flew an aerial 
reconnaissance mission over the island during the planning stages, and concluded that 
Kindley field offered the best choice for a drop zone. However, his recommendation 
was disapproved by Gen. Krueger, who felt it “would not place the troopers on the key 
terrain feature quickly enough, and worse, the men landing on the airstrip would be 
subjected to the same plunging fire that troops making an amphibious assault would 
have to face”.42 Additionally, the paratroopers dropped on the airfield would have to 
then fight uphill – twice – first up Malinta Hill, and then upwards from Bottomside 
to Topside on their drive to secure the critical ‘head’ of the island.43 Consequently, 
the decision was made to drop the troops onto Topside, They would then have the 
advantage of fighting downhill, rather than uphill. The two potential drop zones on 
Topside – the parade field and the golf course – however, were far from ideal. 
As these plans were being developed, aerial bombardment of the island by B-24 
Liberators armed with 226,8-kilogram (500-pound) bombs began on 23 January and 
continued for 25 days, with the final bombing run between 07:45 and 08:00 on 16 
February. After 08:00, A-20s continued strafing runs on other parts of the islands, as 
well as neighbouring Caballo Island, to support the airborne and sea assaults while 
naval gunfire support from the Seventh US fleet fired in support of the amphibious 
assault by the 3/34th Infantry, scheduled to land on the south shore at San Jose44 (see 
Figure 8). In the final version of the assault plan, there were three lifts of the 503rd 
Parachute Regimental Combat Team on to the drop zones, beginning with the 3rd 
Battalion and attached engineer and field artillery units at 08:30 on 16 February, 
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followed by the second lift (2nd Battalion) at 12:15 on 16 February, and the third 
(1st Battalion) at 08:30 on 17 February.45 While this violated the principle of mass in 
airborne operations, it was the only feasible option based on the number of transport 
aircraft available and the size of the drop zones,46 to be discussed below. A coordinated 
amphibious assault by the 3rd Battalion, 34 Infantry Regiment was planned for two 
hours after the fi rst pass over the drop zone. By that time, the planners estimated the 
Japanese defenders would be fully focused on the fi ght at Topside while allowing the 
paratroopers enough time to secure positions from which they could establish support 
by fi re positions to support the landing of the 3/34th.47 
While the Americans benefi tted from an exceptional level of terrain intelligence, 
which enabled their planning, intelligence on the enemy was lacking. Sixth Army 
intelligence offi  cers estimated that there were no more than 850 Japanese defenders on 
Corregidor. However, once on the ground, the Rock Force found itself fi ghting against 
almost 6 000 Japanese naval troops in its eff orts to secure the island.48 
Figure 8: Map detailing the plan to assault Corregidor. The 503rd Parachute 
Regimental Combat Team would parachute onto Topside, on drop zones A (parade 
ground) and B (golf course) starting at 08:30 on 16 February 1945. Two hours 
after the start of that fi rst drop, the 3/34th Infantry (reinforced) would commence 
an amphibious landing on the south shore of Bottomside, on the beach adjacent to 
the village of San Jose. Once the airborne assault had begun, air and naval gunfi re 
support shifted to east of the Strafe Line, from Breakwater Point to Battery Point.49  
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Figure 9: This map depicts the location of drop zones A (parade ground) and B (golf 
course), the prevailing wind pattern, and the approach fl ight routes for the 317th 
Troop Carrier Group.50
The cultural landscape: challenges and opportunities 
It seems somewhat ironic that spaces organised for pre-war training and recreation 
had to be the locations selected to conduct the airborne assault to recapture Corregidor. 
These locations were signifi cant during the pre-war years. The parade ground was 
used for formations, training, physical exercise, and other functions. The golf course 
provided a recreational outlet that was enjoyed across many Army posts. These drop 
zones were, however, the only relatively fl at, open areas suitable for an airborne drop. 
Soldiers who used both spaces prior to the war could not have foretold that these two 
features of the cultural landscape would play such a vital role in 1945. Once decided, 
planners’ understanding of the wind patterns allowed them to plan the approach fl ight 
for the drop (see Figure 9 and 10).
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Figure 10: Aerial photo taken by the 17th Recon Squadron showing the locations 
of drop zone A (parade ground in front of the long barracks) and drop zone B (golf 
course – under cloud). Note the precipitous slopes on the south edges of these drop 
zones, as well as the remnants of the barracks and other buildings on the edges of 
these drop zones.51 
The airborne lifts, therefore, planned to drop one battalion task force onto 
the two drop zones at a time, and the biggest challenge of using the parade ground 
and the golf course was their size. Because of the small size of the drop zones, only 
six to eight paratroopers could exit the aircraft in a pass, which required the planes 
to drop their fi rst pass, then circle around for a second and third pass to drop each 
stick. In the primary and secondary sources, there appears to be little consensus on 
the actual size of these spaces. Table 1 illustrates the size of each drop found within 
various sources. Diff erent sources used either feet or yards, so these were converted 
(in red) to show equivalencies. As photographs of the drop zones show (Figure 10 
and 11), the edges are not clearly defi ned and therefore subject to some interpretation. 
Considering the 317th Troop Carrier Group was the air unit assigned to deliver the 
503rd Parachute Infantry onto the drop zones and likely had the best access to aerial 
reconnaissance and photography, the size estimates of those sources appear the most 
likely approximation. The real value of this data confi rms that these two drop zones 
were signifi cantly smaller than that desired for an infantry battalion. 
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Table 1: Comparison of the sizes of the drop zones in various sources. 
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Figure 11: This image shows the steep cliffs on the southwest side of Corregidor 
with drop zone A (parade field) on the left and drop one B (golf course) on the right. 
Notice the parachutes on the edge and down the cliffs.52 
While the parade ground and golf course provided the necessary (but exceptionally 
small) spaces needed for drop zones, the other elements of the cultural landscape 
proved to offer both challenges and advantages for the paratroopers. One issue that 
confronted the airborne forces was the remnants of the other features of the cultural 
landscape (buildings) along the edges of these open spaces (see Figure 12). While these 
buildings posed significant obstacles to the paratroopers under normal conditions, the 
results of this bombing, while serving to soften the target prior to the assault, added 
to the difficulty of these locations as drop zones (see Figure 12). Crawford, in his 
monograph of the operation states:
The entire island is guttered with deep ravines with precipitous sides. 
The aerial bombardment had stripped the trees of any foliage and 
splintered and shattered the trunks until they created a parachute 
hazard. The bombing had also wrecked the buildings. The barracks 
buildings were of the three story reinforced concrete type and, after 
bombing, created still another parachute hazard. The fields selected 
for the drop abounded in bomb craters, huge boulders, and large 
sunbaked clods of clay which were almost like rock themselves. The 
cliffs facing the beach, sides of the ravines and the old gun batteries 
had been made into well-fortified positions.53 
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Figure 12: “At 0830 hours, with the first parachutes yet to land, a C-47 passes 
over Officers Row and drops on Landing Zone B. There are 7 chutes pictured. The 
25 knot wind really blew us back. Between the Ciné and Mile Long Barracks, on 
an angle, is the telephone exchange building – it’s early seizure will shatter all 
organised Japanese communication throughout the island.”54  
Levine comments on the ‘hazards’ these bombed buildings and debris posed also 
noted that they created arguably the most dangerous drop zone of any in World War 
II. While the planners expected jump casualty rates of 20%, Col. Jones thought they 
could run as high as 50%, based on the small size of the drop zones and debris and 
ruined structures around them.55 However, planners estimated jump casualties would 
still be below those of a solely amphibious assault. Fortunately, for the 503rd, these 
estimates proved wrong; nevertheless, the unit did suffer the highest jump casualty 
rate of any airborne operation in the war.56 
A report prepared for the adjutant general on the operation to highlight lessons 
learned for future airborne planning and operations listed the actual casualty rates 
during the entire operation at 10,7%, but also noted that “of the total number of men 
who dropped over the cliffs, nine made their way to the beach and were taken off by 
naval craft, making the actual loss on the jump 11,2%,” – higher than any other US 
airborne operation in the war, but still 9% lower than the pre-assault estimate.57 
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Table 2: American casualties during the Corregidor operation.58 
Total number of jumpers 2 065
Injured on landing 203
Killed: chute malfunction 3
Killed: striking buildings 2
Killed in action (KIA) by enemy prior to or on landing 0
Missing 14
Actual casualties: 222
Over the cliff but recovered 9
Jump casualty rate 11,2%
Closer examination of these casualties revealed that 75% of all jump casualties were 
sustained during the first drop, but that there were no serious wounds (from enemy 
fire) received prior to landing. Once the first lift began dropping their troops, Col. 
Jones, flying over the island in a command plane, was able to make adjustments to 
the drop altitude and ‘go’ point for each stick to start the jump, which undoubtedly 
reduced the number of potential jump casualties. Of the 203 jumpers injured on 
landing, 180 had to be evacuated and “twenty odd of the men incurring injuries from 
the jump stayed in action for a day or more before being hospitalized”.59 Comparing 
the jump casualties (222 paratroopers) with the total killed, wounded, injured and 
sick, 26,6% of the casualties of 503rd PRCT resulted from the airborne drop. 
Table 3: Total number of casualties by type suffered by US forces during the 
Corregidor operation. Jump casualties are not listed separately.60 
Aside from the jump casualties, the first lift of the 503rd faced little opposition 
initially. As many official history reports and first-hand accounts noted, the Japanese 
appeared to be completely surprised by the airborne assault and Topside was defended 
by “only a few small groups of Japanese armed with light machines guns and 
rifles”.61 By the time they did start to react, many of the first passes were safely on 
the ground and working to suppress Japanese defensive positions. Smith noted that 
several officers in the first lift attempted to call for cancelling the second lift because 
of the hazardous conditions, but because of communications issues, the second lift 
proceeded as planned, dropping the first of its three passes over the drop zone at 
12:40, 25 minutes later than planned.62 
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While the second lift sustained fewer jump casualties, because of the adjustments 
made from the first, more paratroopers were shot while in the air or upon landing. 
However, post-action reports did not reveal how many were included in these 
categories. Although jump casualty rates were lower for the second lift, and the two 
battalions (first two lifts) were securing control of Topside, Col. Jones cancelled the 
third lift (1st Battalion) scheduled for 08:30 on the second day, 17 February. This force 
was flown via the transports to Luzon, trucked to Mariveles, and then transported to 
the island via landing craft for a landing on the beach secured by the 3/34th Infantry. 
The conditions in and around the drop then, were severely hazardous. Shattered 
buildings, debris, craters and splintered trees proved treacherous to many of the 
soldiers landing on or near the drop zones. One soldier, who experienced a parachute 
malfunction, landed in a swimming pool that was empty and unused during the time 
of the attack. Capt. Henry Hill, commander of E Company, 2/503rd, landed on the top 
of a three-storey building, upon which his chute collapsed and he “tumbled through 
the ruins to the ground floor”, his only “injury seven teeth knocked out or broken 
off”.63 For him, though, this proved fortunate as the enemy machine gun positions 
were sweeping the area around the building and the drop zone with intense fire. 
Although the remnants of the cultural landscape (buildings) proved hazardous 
during the jump, these same features provided cover and protection for the forces once 
on the ground. In that same building, Capt. Hill found around fifty men from E and F 
companies trapped inside because of enemy fire. Additionally, an inherent challenge 
during airborne operations is the ability for paratroopers to quickly form into their 
coherent units once on the ground. To enable this, these designated assembly locations 
must be clearly identifiable and easily recognisable. The assembly area for Hill’s 
company was the west end of the Long Barracks, north of the parade field drop zone. 
However, he could not reach this location because of enemy fire. Once the Japanese 
position pinning him down was reduced, he found his company executive officer, Lt 
Donald Abbott, at the assembly point with approximately sixty men. Such locations 
made it relatively easy for paratroopers to find their assembly points, although as 
Hill’s case demonstrates, not always easy to reach. 
This barracks, the longest in the world at the time, lay in ruins, but like the 
other remaining structures, offered protection and cover for the airborne forces to 
consolidate and organise their efforts to clear Topside (see Figure 13). This feature 
of the cultural landscape was close to the drop zones and ultimately served as the 
Rock Force Command Post and Regimental Combat Team headquarters, the 462nd 
Field Artillery Battalion Command Post and Fire Direction Center, the 161st Engineer 
Company Command Post as well as other attached assets such as the Joint Assault 
Signal Company and Support Air Party headquarters, and the force’s medical 
detachments, which established their casualty collection point and field hospital in 
the ruins. 
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Figure 13: A 75 mm artillery piece of the 462nd Field Artillery Battalion on drop 
zone A (parade field) with the remnants of the Long Barracks in the background. US 
Army Signal Corps photo.64
Although the first lift of the airborne operation caught the Japanese defenders off 
guard and achieved surprise, this did not last long. The operation ultimately took from 
16 February until 2 March – a period of incredibly hard fighting to declare the island 
secure. Throughout this battle, the cultural landscape played a pivotal role, not only 
during the planning and initial airborne drop, but also in the subsequent fight to secure 
control over key features of Corregidor’s landscape. 
Conclusion
Although there were strategic reasons that led to the American assault on 
Corregidor (to eliminate Japanese abilities to interdict Allied shipping into Manila 
Bay), there were also symbolic motivations as well. As Flanagan noted, “[its] capture 
would erase from the minds of the American people the dark memories of 1942 – the 
tortured prisoners and the ignominy of Wainwright’s surrender – and these were the 
inspirational reasons for taking Corregidor”.65 And as Gen. MacArthur proclaimed, 
“History, I am sure will record it as one of the decisive battles of the world … Let 
no man henceforth speak of it other than a magnificent victory.”66 Clearly, these 
symbolic objectives were as important as the strategic considerations. Moreover, 
these objectives aside, the American assault on Corregidor highlights many parallels 
to conflict today. 
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As this research demonstrates, the 1945 battle to recapture Corregidor Island is 
an excellent case study of military geography, not only from an historical perspective, 
but also for its similarities to the current operating environment. This analysis 
demonstrates that while the physical terrain of Corregidor was challenging and 
weather was a vital consideration, the cultural landscape proved far more significant 
in the planning and the subsequent course of the battle. Without those two small 
spaces, developed for pre-war training and recreation activities, an airborne assault 
on to Topside was not possible. As a result, an airborne assault on Kindly field on the 
tail of the island or an entirely amphibious assault would have played directly into the 
Japanese defensive plan, with potentially much larger US casualties. Although the 
small size of these drop zones and the gutted buildings and debris from the pre-assault 
bombardment resulted in the highest jump casualties of the war, these same features 
likely saved American lives, providing cover and protection against Japanese fire once 
the paratroopers had landed. 
While modern technology has enabled military forces to overcome many 
challenges of geography, Flanagan’s analysis, although focused on the specifics of 
the battle of Corregidor, offers sage advice for military planners and commanders 
applicable to today: “The successful commander is the one who studies the situation, 
assesses his forces and the enemy, analyzes the terrain, considers the weather, and 
the weighs all of the factors and makes a decision.”67 The intent of this analysis was 
to broaden traditional conceptions of terrain and illuminate the potential effects of 
cultural landscapes in war. In today’s much more populated world, with ever more 
ways humans modify the natural landscape, military operations are increasingly 
affected by the cultural landscape, which could pose unique challenges and 
opportunities. Analysing historical examples of such effects can provide valuable 
insights into the present and the future on how these cultural landscapes may influence 
military operations. 
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